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RECENT CASES
area of negligence. 15 There has been no statuatory determi-
nation of the question.
It is submitted that the admissibility of evidence of prior
accidents to show notice or knowledge of danger causing an
accident does not readily lend itself to statuatory provision,
and that it will be incumbent upon North Dakota attorneys
to investigate thoroughly the court proceedings in other states.
Although the permanency of condition approach has a great
deal of merit, it may, if adopted as a criterion for admitting
evidence of prior accidents, have a tendency to place the
plaintiff at a disadvantage; thus giving rise to unjust
decisions because of a lack of pertinent evidence.
PAUL CRARY
CRIMINAL LAW - FORMER JEOPORDY - DISCHARGE OF
THE JURY BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF A MATERIAL PROSE-
CUTION WITNESS-The petitioner was brought to trial on
a federal conspiracy indictment. The jury was impaneled
and sworn, but before any evidence was presented a mistrial
was declared because a material prosecution witness was
absent. Two days later a new jury was selected and the
petitioner was convicted. The United States Supreme Court
held, four Justices dissenting, that this violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment- " . . . nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life and limb. Downum v. United States,
83 S. Ct. 1033 (1963).
Generally a person is first put "in jeopardy" when he
has been placed on trial under a valid indictment before a
court of competent jurisdiction, has been arraigned and has
pleaded, and a proper jury has been impaneled and sworn
to hear the evidence.2  After jeopardy has thus attached,
15. See Chacey v. City of Fargo, 5 N.D. 173, 64 N.W. 932 (1895). Thislone case allowed evidence of former condition to establish constructive
notice of defect.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Nordlinger v. United States, 24 App. D.C. 406 (Sup. Ct. 1904);
United States v. Van Vliet, 23 Fed. 35 (E.D. Mich. 1885). See, McCarthy
v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (10th Cir. 1936). (Jeopardy attaches in a case
without a jury when the accused "has been indicted and arraigned, has
pleaded, and the court has begun to hear evidence.")
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a second prosecution will ordinarily be barred upon dis-
charge of the jury without the consent of the accused.'
However, under the "manifest necessity" exception, a
trial may be discontinued when particular circumstances so
require, and when the ends of justice would otherwise be
defeated.4  In this situation jeopardy is said not to have
attached, and therefore no double jeopardy results when a
second trial is held.5
It is at the discretion of the court, "taking all the cir-
cumstances into consideration," whether there are sufficient
grounds for invoking this "manifest necessity" exception.6
A court must never lose concern for the protection of the de-
fendant's rights. Thus the defendant's valued right to have
his trial completed by one tribunal7 may be subordinated
to the public interest only upon manifest necessity.8  Ex-
amples of such a situation include when the jury fails to
agree on a verdict,9 when a juror becomes incapacitated, 10
when it is discovered that a juror is biased,11 or when other
"unforseeable circumstances" arise, making completion of
the trial impossible.1 2
But should this discretion be abused to the detriment
of the defendant, the awarding of a new trial will not be
upheld.1 3  Harassment of an accused by successive prose-
3. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957); Kepner v. United
States, 195 U.S. 100, 128 (1904).
4. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
5. State v. Emery, 59 Vt. 84, 7 Alt. 129 (1886).
6. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 427 (1953); United States
v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1.824); Cornero v. United States. 48 F.2d
69 (9th Cir. 1931).
7. United States v. Whitlow, 110 F. Supp. 871 (D.D.C. 1953).
8. See, Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); United States v. Harri-
man, 130 F. Supp. 198, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
9. Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71
(1902); Iogan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
10. United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1941) cert. denied, 313
U.S. 584 (1941) (Juror incapacitated); United States v. Haskell, 26 Fed. Cas.
207 (No. 15321) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (insanity of juror).
11. Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (petit juror was
member of indicting grand jury); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148
(1891) (juror acquainted with accused); United States v. Cimino, 224 F.2d
274 (2d Cir. 1955) (juror prejudiced to accused).
12. See, Wade v. Hunter, supra note 8 at 689 (military tactics necessi-
tated discontinuance of court-martial); Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199(1916) (failure to have the defendant arraigned before trial).
13. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 338
U.S. 860 (1949); United States v. Watson, 28 Fed. Cas. 499 (No. 16651)
(D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868).
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cutions,"4 or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the
prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict, 15 are
examples.
In the instant case the prosecutor had not checked on
the presence of his witness before allowing the jury to be
sworn. The trial court thought that under the circumstances,
a mistrial should be granted. 6  The majority opinion ap-
plied to this case the rule of cases where the prosecutor be-
gan trial without sufficient evidence to convict, thus entitl-
ing the defendant to an acquittal." Accordingly, the major-
ity ruled that the absence of the witness should have entitled
the petitioner to an acquittal, thus barring a new trial under
the Former Jeopardy Rule.
The dissenting opinion thought that the defendant's cause
had not been sufficiently prejudiced by the trial court's al-
lowance of two days for the government to locate its key
witness. 8  The "ends of public justice" require that the
government have a fair opportunity to present the people's
case and obtain adjudication on the merits, 9 rather than
freeing a criminal because of a harmless oversight of the
prosecutor. Thus they argued that the "manifest necessity"
exception should have been applied and a second trial al-
lowed.
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion is the better
view. Freeing the accused on a technicality not prejudicial
14. See, Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); Kepner v. United
States, supra note 3.
15. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); Cf. Clawans v. Rives, 104
F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
16. The petitioner's case was No. 10 (of 12 set for the week), and
the prosecutor stated that he did not forsee that it would be reached on
Tuesday. The marshal could not locate a key witness but the prosecutor
was told that the witness' wife would inform the marshal of her husband's
whereabouts. On Tuesday the petitioner's case was called while the pros-
ecutor was engaged in another trial. Being unable to locate the marshal,
the prosecutor announced he was ready for trial without ascertaining
whether or not the witness was present.
17. Cornero v. United States, supra note 6; United States v. Watson,
supra note 13. "When the trial of an indictment has been commenced by
the swearing of the jury, the defendant is in their charge, and he is en-
titled to a verdict of acquittal if the case on the part of the prosecution
is, for any reason, not made out against him .. "
18. Wade v. Hunter, supra note 8. But see Cornero v. United States.
supra note 6.
19. Brock v. State of North Carolina, supra note 6; Himmelfarb v.
United States, supra note 13.
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to his cause leaves his guilt undetermined, and serves to
defeat the public's interest in the conviction of criminals.
GORDON W. SCHNELL
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - ACTIONS - EFFECT OF LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE ON GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY-City defendant,
as a government function, owned and maintained a tobaggan
slide for the use of the public. There was no ad-
mission charged. The plaintiff sues to recover damages
for injuries sustained when her toboggan struck a patch of
frozen hummocks at the bottom of the hill. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin in reversing the trial court decision held,
two Justices dissenting, that since the city had taken out
liability insurance and the insurer had agreed not to raise
the defense of governmental immunity while defending in the
city's name; the city had thereby waived its immunity and
plaintiff could recover. The dissent argued that the procure-
ment of insurance in and of itself, should not create liability
where none theretofore existed. Marshall v. City of Green
Bay, 118 N.W.2d 715 (Wis. 1963).
The general rule is that the carrying of liability insurance
has no effect on existing immunity in the performance of
governmental functions.' Such immunity has been deemed
fundamental and jurisdictional when running to subdivisions
of the state. 2 The majority of jurisdictions hold that in the
absence of a statute expressly granting such power, a govern-
mental unit cannot make an agreement which will waive
immunity from tort liability.3 This would be considered a
usurpation of legislative powers. 4 It has not been the intent
of legislatures, in authorizing the procurement of insurance
1. Hummer v. School City of Hartford County, 124 Ind. App. 30, 112
N.E.2d 891 (1953): Stucker v. County of Muscatine, 249 Ia. 485, 87 N.W.2d
452 (1958); Maffei v. Inc. Town of Kemmerer, 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808
(1959).
2. Mann v. County Bd. of Arlington County, 199 Va. 169, 98 S.E.2d 515(1957).
3. Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E.2d 195 (1950);
Boice v. Board of Ed. of Rock Dist., 111 W.Va. 95, 160 S.E. 566 (1931);
Price v. State Highway Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1946). The
court in the principal case expressly overruled Pohland v. City of She-
boygan, 251 Wis. 10, 27 N.W.2d 736 (1947) which was in accord with the
above authority.
4. Livingston v. New Mexico College of A. & M. Arts, 64 N.M. 306. 328
P.2d 78 (1958).
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